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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
RRAS,¥ELL MOTOR FREIGHT
LINES, INC., a corporation,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
RANK OF SALT LAKE, a corporation,

Case No.
12784

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
OF CASE
Appellant instituted this proceeding to recover the
amount of $57 4,031.32 which was deposited in appellant's account with respondent and thereafter paid out
by respondent without the authority or direction of appe ll:mt. After preliminary discovery procedures were
rompleted, respondent moved the lower court for a
Summary Judgment of no cause of action on appellant's complaint for the following reasons:

°'' *

*

"that there are no legitimate issues of
fact and that plaintiff's claim is barred by the
following provisions of Utah Code Annotated,
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1953, as amended, Sections 22-1-1, 22-1-9 and
70A-3-405, and the holding of Sugarhouse
Finance Company v. Zions First National
Bank, 21 Utah 2d Reports ( 68), 440 P.2d 80!)
(869) ." (R. 93)
Thereafter, appellant moved the lower court for a
summary judgment interlocutory in character as to the
issue of liability pursuant to Rule 56, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, on the ground that:

***

"the pleadings, depositions, interrogatories and answers thereto show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact, and that
the (Appellant) , Braswell l\Iotor Freight
Lines, Inc., is entitled as a matter of law to a
judgment in its favor on the issue of liability."
(R. 98)
DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT
Appellant's l\Iotion for Summary Judgment was
denied by the lower court with the exception of the
amount of $24,523.90 which remained on deposit in ap·
pellant's account at the commencement of this proceed·
ing and for which Summary Judgment was entered in
favor of appellant and against respondent. With re·
spect to all other issues, namely, the liability of respon·
dent to appellant for the amount of $549,507.42 whicl1
had been withdrawn from appelJant's account prior to
the commencement of this proceeding, the lower cour!
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granted respondent's l\1otion for Summary Judgment
against appellant, no cause of action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment of the
lower court insofar as the same denies appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment relating to the liability of
respondent to appellant for the funds withdrawn from
appellant's account prior to the commencement of this
proceeding and a reversal of the judgment of the lower
court insofar as the same grants respondent's Motion
for Summary .T udgment and relieves respondent from
any liability to appellant for the funds withdrawn from
appellant's account.
STATE1\1ENT OF FACTS
On the 3rd day of July, 1969, Mr. William M.
Kendall, one of respondent's checking account customers
since February 17, 1969 (R 33), appeared at the respondent Bank of Salt Lake and expressed a desire to
open a corporate account in the name of Braswell :Motor
Freight Lines. During discussions with Joanne Sullivan. New Accounts Secretary, Earl Weaver, Cashier
and Norton Parker, President of respondent, Mr. Kendall reported that he was an agent for Braswell Motor
Freight Lines negotiating for the purchase of a dormant
trucking authority in the State of Utah. (R 32)
The Application to open a corporate account was
prepared by Joanne Sullivan and discloses that Braswell
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.Motor Freight Lines is a corporation and that the ac.
count ·was to be a commercial-corporate account. (R 42)
The account was opened on the 3rd day of July, 1969,
in the name of Braswell :Motor Freight Lines, Account
Number 110-197, with an init'al cash deposit of $50.00.
(R 25)
Respondent accepted a Corporation Account signature card for Account Number 110-197 in the name of
Braswell
Freight Lines. The signature card 'ms
signed by 'Villiam l\I. Kendall as "President" of the
depositor ( R ·12) and the same was accepted by respondent notwithstand:ng the oral representation of
William
Kendall that he was only a negotiating
agent for Braswell l\1otor Freight Lines. (R 32)
Respondent admittedly failed to obtain a certified
copy of a resolution of the Board of Directors of Bras·
well lVIotor Freight l)nes authorizing the opening of the
account and designating the individuals authorized to
make withdrawals. (R 27)
The Corporation Account signature card previous·
ly referred to incorporates the condition,., set forth on
the reverse side thereof, " ... as a part of th;s contract."
(R 41) The reverse side contains an "Authorizing Res·
olution" that certifies the directors of the corporation
opening the account have adopted a resolution authoriz·
ing the officers whose names appear on the reverse s;de
to sign checks against funds of the corporation. The
"Authorizing Resolution" portion of the signature card
was never completed and executed by Braswell :Motor
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Freight Lines. Respondent accepted the incomplete
signature card without any other form of corporate
resolution.
concedes that since 1960 it has been
the practice of respondent to secure such a corporate
resolution and that respondent has had, and continues
to have, corporate resolution forms available for use by
corporate depositors. (R 36) The fact remains that this
practice was not followed in this matter.
It is further admitted by respondent that at no fme
did respon<leut inquire into the corporate or financial
status of Bras·well lV[otor Freight Lines (R 26), or the
relationship of William l\i. Kendall to Braswell Motor
Freight Lines. (R 33) As a matter of fact, William M.
Kendall was never employed by Braswell :Motor Freight
Lines in any capacity for any purpose. (Deposition of
J. V. Braswell, p. 26) Respondent further concedes
that it honored Kendall's request to hold the monthly
statements at respondent's banking house for Kendall's
pick-up rather than forward the same to the corporate
owner of the account. (R 31)

The account was opened July 3, 1969 with a $50.00
cash deposit. (R 25) On July 10, 1969, a deposit of
$134,136.12 lvas made to Account Number 110-197 and
subsequent deposits and the dates thereof were as follows: January 30, 1970, $145,649.44; April 14, 1970,
$103,108.98; June 22, 1970, $92,275.82; and, August
13, 1970, $U8,810.96. (R 28) All of the deposits were
by checks drawn on the Oak Cliff Bank & Trust Com-
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pany of Dallas, Texas, by Braswell l\Iotor Freight
Lines, Inc., payable to Braswell l\Iotor Freight Lines.
(R 76, 77, 78) On deposit, all of the checks were endorsed "For Deposit Only". (R 76, 77, 78)
There were a total of 21 withdrawals from Account
Number 110-197, with 16 withdrawals being by checks
drawn by William M. Kendall payable to cash as follows: July 20, 1969, $85,000.00 and July 28, 1969,
$500.00; (R 75) August 5, 1969, $20,000.00 and August
8, 1969, $20,000.00; (R 72) September 5, 1969,
$4,500.00; (R 69) December 5, 1969, $3,000.00; (R 67)
February 17, 1970, $96,500.00; (R 64) l\Iarch 6, 1970,
$25,000.00; (R 60) April 14, 1970, $3,000.00; (R 57)
May 4, 1970, $40,000.00 and l\iay 22, 1970, $35,000.00;
(R 54) July 10, 1970, $42,500.00; (R 49) August 4,
1970, $25,000.00 and August 5, 1970, $14,500.00;
(R 46) September 2, 1970, $40,000.00 and September
17, 1970, $25,000.00. (R 44)
In addition, five withdrawals were accomplished
by checks drawn by William l\f. Kendall payable to
the Astro Auto Center as follows: l\'Iarch 18, 1970,
$20,000.00; (R 60) l\fay 1, 1970, $25,000.00; (R 54)
May 29, 1970, $5,000.00; (R 51) July 10, 1970, $10,000.00; (R 49) and, August 28, 1970, $10,000.00.
(R 44)
Ten cashier's checks were issued by respondent
after \iVilliam l\:I. Kendall had indorsed to respondent
various checks payable to cash. Six cashier's checks
named William l\:I. Kendall as payee; ( R 43, 49, 54, 62,
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64) one named Ben l\iartin and Co.; ( R 62) cne named
Securitv Pacific National Bank; (R 64) one named
M. D. 'Verts and one named W. H. Werts. (R 75)

The subtotal of the above enumerated 21 withdrawals, excluding the cashier's checks because the
amounts thereof are included in the withdrawals payable to cash, amounts to $549,500.00. Two additional
withdra,vals that occurred July 25, 1969, in the amounts
of $5.75 and $1.67 (R 28) bring the total withdrawals
to $549,507.42.
Notwithstanding the irregular circumstances surrounding the opening, deposits and withdrawals regarding Account Number 110-197, respondent did not contact appellant until respondent had permitted $524,507.42 to be withdrawn by William M. Kendall from
Account Number 110-197. On September 17, 1970, according to respon:lent's Answers to Interrogatories:
"Earl 'Veaver, Cashier of Bank of Salt
in a telephone conversation with Mr. Henry
Jones (an employee of appellant) on September 17, 1970, queried Mr. Jones as to whether
it was proper for William M. Kendall to withdraw a large amount of cash from the Braswell lVIotor Freight Lines account. Mr. Jones
indicated that he was not aware that Braswell
.Motor Freight Lines had an account with
Bank of Salt Lake and that it did not sound
proper but that it was possible that lVIr. Braswell was engaged in a private transaction with
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l\fr. Kendall, that l\Ir. Braswell was out of
town and unable to be reached, and that on the
possibility that there was a special arrangement with :Mr. Braswell, .l\1r. 'Veaver should
release the $25,000.00 cash withdrawal to William Kendall." ( R 34)
It is interesting to note that when respondent
finally concerned itself with the propriety of the arrangement and the conduct of 'Villiam
Kendall,
respondent knew whom to contact, namely, Braswell
Motor Freight Lines, Inc., Dallas, Texas, appellant
herein. Had respondent acted in such a manner before
permitt'ng the withdrawals, appellant would not have
suffered the loss of $549,507.42 from its Account Number 110-197.

After the telephone conversation of September 17,
1970, wherein appellant ·was first advised as to the existence of the account and the dealings of William M.
Kendall, appellant advised respondent by letter under
date of September 21, 1970, that the account was unauthorized and that William .M:. Kendall was not authorized to open the account. (R 79) The withdrawal of
$25,000.00 on September 17, 1970, was the last withdrawal from Account Number 110-197.
On June 7, 1971, a representative of Ernst &
Ernst submitted its Standard Bank Confirmation Inquiry to respondent. ( R 95) The information requested
therein was to assist Ernst & Ernst, a certified public ac-
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counting firm, in their servicing of the account of Braswell l\Iotor F'reight Lines, Inc., Dallas, Texas, appellant
herein. The Standard lfank Confirmation Inquiry was
executed by John 'V. Twelves, Vice President, Bank
of Salt Lake, and admitted that as of the close of business on December 31, 1970, Account Number 110-197,
in the account name of Braswell :Motor Freight Lines,
Inc., had a balance of $24,.523.90. (R 97) This balance
was awarded to appellant by the lower court. However, the lower court denied appellant's claim against
respondent for the amount of $549,507.42, withdrawn
from appellant's account without authority and for
general damages.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE OPENING OF TI-IE CORPORATE AC-

COUNT CREATED A LEGALLY PROTECTABLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN APPELLANT AND RESPONDENT.
A. APPELLANT IS THE SAME CORPORATE ENTITY AS THE DESIGNATED
011., ACCOUNT NUMBER 110-197.
'Villiam .l\I. Kendall opened Account Number
110-197 in the name of Braswell ]\'rotor Freight Lines.
J\ ppellant submits that Braswell Motor Freight Lines
arnl
.Motor Freight Lines, Inc., of Dallas,
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Texas, appellant herein, are one and the same corporate
entity. In 1Jlerchandise Reporting Co., Inc. v. We.:ss &
Golding, 168 So. 336 (La. 1936), the court stated at
page 342:
"It is common knowledge that corporations
frequently do not use the words 'incorporated'
or 'limited,' which form a part of its corporate
name."
Also, in Goldberg, Bowen & Co. v Di1n2ck, 169 Cal.
187, 146 P. 672 (1915), the court stated at page 673:
* * * "There is, as we have seen, a practical
identity of the name of the payee in the notes
and the title of the plaintiff, and, even if there
were a variation, the rule is that where the parties to a contract can be ascertained, and an
is prosecuted in the name of the real
party, an error in the name of the promisee
as decribed in the promise is not a proper
basis of defense."***
The entire area rela ting
tion or deletion of "Inc.'' in
summarized in 6 Fletcher
(Perm. Ed), "Name", Sec.
Volume 1968) , as follows :

to the effect of the addia corporate designation is
Cyclopedia Corporations
244, at p. 186, (Revised

"The omission of a part of the name of a corporation, when the name consists of several
words, will not affect the validity of an
instrument, if the corporation intended can be
identified, and the same may be said of the
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erroneous inclusion of a word or words, such
as the word 'the.' The addition or ornission of
the term 'Inc.' is not material where it is apparent that such abbreviation merely means a
corporation and is descriptive merely, and not
an essential part of the name." * * * (Emphasis added)
Respondent had been informed by William M.
Kendall that he was a negotiating agent for a company
known as Braswell :Motor Freight Lines. (R 32) The
;nclusion of the "Inc." would have been merely descriptive of the corporate status of the company, a fact which
could have been safely presumed by respondent. Respondent could not have been misled or deceived by the
deletion of the "Inc." on the name of the corporate account of Braswell Motor Freight Lines when, in fact,
respondent completely failed to concern itself and investigate the corporate or financial status of the designated owner. (R 26) Furthermore, respondent's
acceptance of the account as a commercial-corporate account would eliminate any question regarding the
corporate status of Braswell Motor Freight Lines. (R
41, 42)

As a factual matter, when respondent finally became suspicious of 'iVilliam 1\-1. Kendall's dealings and
attempted to verify Kendall's authority with the owner
of the account, respondent contacted appellant, Braswell :Motor Freight Lines, Inc. (R 84) Appellant's
ownership of Account Number 110-197 is further confirmed by respondent's reply to the Standard Bank
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Confirmation Inquiry executed by John ,V. Twelves,
Vice President, Bank of Salt Lake, respondent, wherein it ·was stated that Account Number 110-197 was in
the name of Br:'lswell l\lotor Fright Lines, Inc. ( R 97)

'v

B. APPELLANrr
AS THE OWNER OF
TI-IE FUNDS DEPOSITED IN ACCOUNT
NUl\IBER 110-197.
The funds cred;ted to Account Number 110-197
were represented by checks drawn on the bank account
of Bras·well l\1otor Freight Lines, Inc., and payable
to Braswell Motor Freight Lines (R 76, 77, 78), the
same corporate entity.
By indorsement of appellant's checks "For Deposit
Only" and the deposit and credit thereof to appellant's
account, the funds remained appellant's even though
appellant was unaware of the opening of Account
Number 110-197 and the deposits cred:ted thereto. In
Lumber Sales Co. v. P'idelity Trust Co., 127
l\1e. 82, 141 A. 102 ( 1928), the District J\1anager of a
corporation opened an account in the name of the corporation 'vithout the company's knowledge or authority.
Withdrawals were subsequently accompli:.;hed by checks
signed by the Distr;ct :Manager as agent for the company but for purposes foreign to the company's business. The court held the bank liable for the unauthorized
withdrawals and stated at 141 A. 104:
"Upon receiving the deposit from the district
manager for the credit of the plaintiff com-
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pany, the relation between that company and
the defendant was that of depositor and
banker, and the defendant became the debtor
of the plaintiff for the amount of the deposit
placed to its credit. Heath v. New Bedford
Safe & Deposit, etc., Co., 184 l\fass. 481, 69
N.E. 215. The deposit was the plaintiff's property even though its existence was unknown.
Brown v. Daugherty ( C.C.) 120 F. 526. Having accepted the deposit, a bank is protected in
paying out the deposit only where it has an
order from the owner of the deposit himself or
one authorized to act for him." * * * (Emphasis added)
:l\Ioney deposited to the account of another is presumed to belong to or be due to the owner of the account, even though the initial opening of the account
is unknown to the owner of the funds deposited therein. TVesterly Community Credit Union v. Indust1·ial
National Bank of Providence, 103 R. I. 662, 240 A.2d
.586 (1968). In the instant matter, appellant's ownership of the funds deposited to Account Number 1101D7 is more than a mere presumption. The uncontested
fact is that the subject checks were drawn by appellant,
made payable to appellant, indorsed "For Deposit
Only" and deposited in appellant's account.
C. A RELATIONSHIP EXISTED BET\\TERN APPELLANT AND RESPONDl-:NT
WHEREBY RESPONDENT COULD PERMIT
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'VITHDRA,;v ALS .FROM: ACCOUNT NUMBER 110-197 ONLY ON THE AUTHORITY OF
APPELLANT.
Having established the ownership of Account Number 110-197 and the funds deposited therein, the next
question is what relationship exists between a bank and
the owner of a corporate account. This relationship is
set forth in Laws v. United States, 66 F.2d 870, wherein it is stated at page 873:
"The relation between a bank and its depositor
is that of debtor and creditor, and the bank may
not pay out a deposit without the authority or
d;rection of the depositor, and it may not properly charge an unauthorized payment to the
deposit."
In JValker Rank & Trust Co. v. First Security
Corp., 9 Utah 2d
341 P.2d 944 (1959), this Court
stated at 9 Utah 2d 218:

* * * "Between the bank and depositor it

(the
relationship) is that of debtor-creditor to the
extent of the customer's balance, (citing cases)
and it is the bank's duty to pay up to that
amount to anyone on the depositor's order and
in conformity with his direction," * * *
The same basic relationship of debtor-creditor ex·
ists between a bank and a depositor notwithstanding the
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fact that the depositor was unaware of the opening of
the account. In Nationwide Homes v. First-Citizens
Bank ,v_ Trust Co., 267 N.C. 528, 148 S.E.2d 693
(1966), plaintiff's employee opened a checking account in plaintiff's name by forging the signature of
plaintiff's officer. The opening of the account was unknown to plaintiff and the employee used the account
to pay some of the plaintiff's bills but misappropriated
the remainder. The court stated at 148 S.E.2d 697:
'''Vhen funds were deposited in the defendant
Bank for credit to an account opened, and later
carried on its books, in the name of the plaintiff, a relation of debtor and creditor between
the Bank and the plaintiff was thereby
ere a ted." * * *
Respondent attempts to negate its duty to appellant by reliance on the Fiduciary Act set forth in 22-1-1
et seq. Utah Code Anno. 1953 (as amended). However,
even a cursory examination of the Fiduciary Act reveals that the same is not applicable to the facts of the
instant case.
A "fiduciary" is defined in Section 22-1-1, Utah
Code Anno. 1953 (as amended), as:

* * * "a trustee under any trust, expressed, im-

plied, resulting or constructive, executor, administrator, guardian, conservator, curator,
receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, assignee for
the benefit of creditors, partner, agent, officer

16

of a corzwration, public or private, public officer, and any other person acting in a fiduciary
capacity for any person, trust or estate."
(Emphas;s added)
It is established that 'Villiam M. Kendall was
never an officer of appellant. In fact, Kendall was
never employed by appellant in any capacity for any
purpose. (Deposition of J. V. Braswell, p. 26)

The absence of any actual relationship between
Kendall and appellant reduces any claim of agency by
respondent to one of "ostensible authority". In Barclay
Kitchen, Inc. v. California Bank, 25 Cal. Rptr. 383
(Cal. D.C. of App., 1962), plaintiff's employee induced the defendant hank to accept deposit slips reflecting se,'eral depository transactions when the deposit
should have reflected a single check. The court recognized the employee's authority to fill out deposit slips
but held that that author;ty did not include the making
of deposit slips that inaccurately reflected the nature
of the deposit. The court stated at 25 Cal. Rptr. 386:

* * * "it is dementary that an agent's authority

cannot be delineated by his own representations. (Citing cases) This rule is not changed
when the relationship of the parties is bank and
depositor (Citing cases) ; and where the depositor is a corporation the bank has a legal
duty to ascertain that the acts of the agents
of the corporation are authorized. (Citing
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cases) FI aving accepted the deposits in question, admittedly irregular, without some cf fort
to ascertain the agent's authority beyond her
own representations, Bank cannot no'W absolve
itself f rorn liability by asserting an ostensible
authority in the agent where in fact no authority •a:as given.
Additionally it may be noted that the issue of
ostensible authority is a question of fact." * * *
(Emphasis added)
At the time Account Number 110-197 was opened,
July 3, 1969 (R 25), the only source of "ostensible
authority" was supplied to respondent by 'Villiam M.
Kendall, the purported agent. Without anything more
than Kendall's statements, the commercial-corporate account was opened with an initial cash deposit by Kendall
of $50.00. (R 25) One week later, July 10, 1969 (R 28),
Kendall made the next deposit, a check drawn by appellant and payable to appellant in the amount of $134,136.12. (R 76)
Respondent continued to accept Kendall's selfdeclared and unsupported statements as authority to
deal freely with the commercial-corporate account and
neYer requested or received supporting documentation.
Admittedly, respondent never investigated Kendall's
alleged relationship with appellant. (R 33)
On September 17, 1970 (R 34), approximately
fifteen months after Account Number 110-197 had
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been opened and $524,507.42 withdrawn therefrom, respondent finally became suspicious of Kendall and
telephoned appellant. (R 34) Had such a simple inquiry been made by respondent on July 3, 1969, one
week before any checks had been drawn on appellant's
Oak Cliff Bank & Trust Company account for subsequent deposit with respondent, the damages now complained of by appellant would not have occurred.
Respondent may not raise the Fiduciary Act as a
legitimate defense because Kendall simply does not
meet the definition of a fiduciary. Further, the Fiduciary Act refers to misconduct and breach of the
obligation by an "authorized" or "empowered" fiduciary.
Kendall was never a fiduciary of appellant by definition
and certainly was never authorized or empowered to
make withdrawals from appellant's corporate account.
A fiduciary obligation may not be violated when it does
not in fact exist.
Respondent relies on Section 70A-3-405, Utah Code
Anno., 1953 (as amended). The portion of said statute
that respondent attempts to apply to the instant matter
provides as follows:
" ( 1) An indorsement by any person m the
name of a named payee is effective if

( c)

an agent or employee of the maker or
drawer has supplied him with the name
of the payee intending the latter to have
no such interest." (Emphasis added)
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The difficulty inherent in applying the above
cited statute to the facts of the instant case is that there
is no dispute that the "indorsement" by William M.
Kendall was effective to accomplish a deposit of the
funds in Account Number 110-197. The five checks
that constitute the total deposits were all indorsed "For
Deposit Only" ( R 76, 77, 78) , and said indorsement
effectively resulted in a credit to appellant's Account
Number 110-197.
The issues presented by a forged payee indorsement
are completely separate and distinct from the issue of
the liability of a depository bank that permits unauthorized withdrawals from a corporate account.

It may here be noted that Article 3 of the Uniform
Commercial Code is designated "Commercial Paper",
and the provisions relating thereto are subject to the
provisions of the Article on "Bank Deposits and Collections" (Article 4) and "Secured Transactions"
(Article 9). See Section 70A-3-103, Utah Code Anno.
1953 (as amended) .
Section 70A-4-103, Utah Code Anno. 1953 (as
amended) , provides, in part:
" (I) The effect of the provisions of this chap-

ter may be varied by agreement except that no
agreement can disclaim a bank's responsibility
for its own lack of good faith or failure to
exercise ordinarv care or can limit the measure
of damages for such lack or failure; but the
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parties may by agreement determine the standards by which such responsibility is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly
unreasonable." (Emphasis added)
Respondent's lack of good faith and failure to exercise ordinary care are clearly evidenced by its failure
to adhere to normal banking standards concerning a
commercial-corporate account and withdrawals therefrom.
D. RESPONDENT VI 0 L ATE D ITS
DUTY TO APPELLANT BY PERl\!IITTING
UNAUTHORIZED \VITIIDRAWALS FROM
ACCOUNT
110-197 AND RESPONDENT IS LIABLE TO APPELLANT FOR
RESULTING THEREFROM.
As stated in 10 Am. J ur.2d, Banks, Sec. 548, on

page 522:

"Of necessity, a corporation can act only
through its officers and agents, and if a corporation is to draw checks, certain of its officers or agents must act in that respect for it
and may be lawfully authorized for such
purpose. vVhen, however, a corporation opens
a deposit account with a bank, the latter, before
paying checks thereon, must be satisfied that
the officer or officers signing the checks on
behalf of the corporation are authorized to do
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so; if the bank pays without question, it takes
the risk of being held still liable for the amount
irregularly paid in such fashion." * * *
See also 5A ltlichie on Banks and Ranking, Section
177·, "Deposit of Corporation", wherein it is stated at
page 442:
"It is held that a bank is not the trustee, qua.Yi
trustee, factor, or agent of a corporate depositor, but its debtor only, and must determine the
question whether the officer signing checks is
authorized to do so, at its peril." * * *

It is conceded that respondent failed to obtain a
certified copy of a resolution by the Board of Directors
of Braswell
Freight Lines, Inc., wherein the
opening of Account Number 110-197 was authorized
and 'iVilliam l\1. Kendall was designated as a duly
authorized officer, director or agent to make withdrawals. (R 27) Respondent chose to accept a Corporate Account signature card that set forth an Authorizing Resolution on the reverse side thereof, but which
was not completed and executed. This incomplete signature card is the only justification advanced by respondent for permitting the withdrawls complained of by
appellant.
In Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Security First National Bank, 56 Cal. Rptr. 142 (Cal. Ct. of App. 1967),
one Drown devised a scheme to defraud his employer
by causing the employer to issue checks which Brown
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convinced the bank to cash or deposit to his personal
account. In reversing the lower court, the Court of Appeals, after considering the relevant provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code, held that the loss was caused
by the negligence of the bank which could have prevented the embezzlement by the exercise of ordinary
care and recognition of standard banking practices,
which it had "codified" in its own house rules. The
court observed at 56 Cal. Rptr. 155:

* **

"Therefore, the issue was not whether
or not a duty existed to 'verify' Brown's
'authority' to direct payment of these checks
contrary to the notations appearing upon the
face of the instruments but whether or not respondent's employee.<.t acted reasonably in assuming Brown had any authority whatsoever
in the premises. 1'hat is to say, before any
question of verification of authority can arise
there must, at least. be some appearance of
authority which then may or may not require
verification. In the instant case, the record is
wholly devoid of any such evidence unless it can
be said as a matter of law that every employee
of unknown rank who comes into possession of
a check made payable to others for specified
purposes has the apparent authority to receive
and appropriate the proceeds thereof to his own
personal benefit." (Some emphasis added)
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Appellant respectfully submits that the lower
court should have ruled as a matter of law that respondent, its officers and employees, failed to act
reasonably in assuming that William M. Kendall had
any authority to withdraw funds from the subject account. The following facts among
support such
a conclusion: ( 1) Kendall was the only individual with
whom respondent dealt and his self-serving representations ·were accepted without question; (R 33) (2) the
signature card accepted by respondent was executed by
Kendall as "President" of Braswell l\lotor Freight
I .ines ( R 42) contrary to the representation that he
was only a negotiating agent; (R 32) (3) the "Authorizing Resolution" on the reverse side of the signature
card was never executed even though the application set
up the account as a commercial-corporate account;
(R 42) ( 4) no other form of authorizing resolution
was requested or demanded by respondent; and ( 5) respondent's compliance with Kendall's curious request
that the monthly statements be held for pick-up rather
than mailed to the owner of the corporate account.
(R 31)
The fact that a valid deposit was accomplished
would not relieve respondent from its duty to permit
only author:zed withdrav.'als. As stated in Paton's Diof Legal Opinions, Vol. 1, page 106, "Even authority tu indorse and deposit does not justify an implication of authority to draw checks."
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In Barclay Kitchens, Inc. t'. ('al:fornia Rank,
supra, the court stated at 25 Cal. Rptr. 389:
''Here, bank was not innocent. * * * Its employees admittedly departed from the 'ord:nary
course' of their banking business. They should
haYe been alert to
Gianopulus' misrepresentation of authority."
Respondent's assumption of Kendall's authority
predicated solely on Kendall's representations in no way
constituted the exercise of ordinary care and adhe1·ence
to standard banking practices. Section 70..A-4-103, Utah
Code Anno., 1953 (as amended).
The court further stated in Pacific I ndcmnity Co.
v. Security First ..Yational Bank, supra, at 56 Cal. Rptr.
156:

'·In the instant case, of course, Bro"11's f orgery of the check orders was not the primary
cause of the loss herein and respondent's employees adm;ttedly Yiolated se,·eral rules of
ordinary banking practice, any one of 1.1.:hich
·a.:ould har:e pret·ented the successful consummation of Brm1.:n's fraudulent scheme." * * *
(Emphasis aclded)
The concurring opinion states at 56 Cal. Rptr. 159:
"In the present case Brm\11 foraed
instruments
I'."'.!
under "hich he was able to put moneys IX
a particular Bank. The Bank acted properly
in recei,·ing the moneys. and ;n this phase of
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the matter no harm was done. But in the second
aspect of the transaction - paying moneys
OUT or crediting an account from which
moneys could be withdrawn-the Bank failed
to take any steps to determine where the credits
derived from the checks properly belonged.
* * * Instead of doing this, the Bank accepted
Brown's request to credit them to his personal
account without the slightest semblance of
actual, apparent, or ostensible authority for so
doing, and indeed without even requiring his
endorsement on the checks. The enti1e scheme
to defraud was made possible by the use of the
Bank's name as payee on the checks, for if
Brown had made himself payee he could never
have got the checks issued. The essence of the
the trick was to get money IN the Bank and
then rely on the Bank's disinterest in what
happened thereafter to get it OUT and away.
\\Then the Bank permitted moneys or credits
to come into its possession, it came under a
duty to disburse them under proper authority,
and for its failure to do so it may be held liable.
(Citing cases)"
The "essence of the trick" in the instant case was
respondent's careless assumption of Kendall's authority
to make withdrawals from the corporate account. Without this, the scheme could not have succeeded; with it,
the way was clear. Had respondent adhered to normal
hanking practices and standards and not blindly ac-
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cepted Kendall's self-serving declarations regarding his
agency and authority to withdraw the funds, appellant
would have recovered the $549,507 .32 exactly as it did
the $24,523.90 that remained on deposit at the commencement of this proceeding.
Appellant respectfully submits that the judgment
of the lower court should be reversed insofar as the
same grants respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and denies appellant's l\tiotion for Partial Summary Judgment, and the matter should be remanded to
the lower court for a determination of the damages
appellant is entitled to recover from respondent.
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